Canucks: How do they compare to the Montreal Canadiens? (Part 3)

Again, let’s go back to the on-paper analysis for this factor.

At the beginning of the season, the Canucks appeared to have a fairly strong group of blueliners, both offensively and defensively. Schmidt brought versatility, being able to play on both sides, Edler and Myers had decent outings in training camp, and Hughes was poised to build off of his impressive rookie campaign.

But, for whatever reason, their group was unable to find or maintain any sort of chemistry, forcing Green to often put his defensive pairings in a blender. Whether it was due to sporadic point production, poor defensive fundamentals, or nagging injuries, the Canucks’ coaching staff were never able to lock down three defensive duos that they felt comfortable rolling out on a nightly basis, and it was evident on the ice.

Part of this can be traced back to the departure of Chris Tanev.

Tanev was a staple on the right side of the Canucks’ blueline for close to a decade. Most recently, during the 2019-20 season, he found instant chemistry with Hughes, and the two of them formed one of the stronger defensive pairings on the team as a result. Hughes was able to showcase his explosive speed and offensive creativity, while Tanev made sure to lock things down defensively if the opponents countered.

In hindsight, yes, it was probably better that the team didn’t commit to Tanev long-term. He had a good first outing in Calgary, but there’s a high chance that the Flames will regret the last year (or two) of that contract, and the Canucks didn’t need to be bogged down with yet another regrettable long-term deal.

The Canucks were also able to find a suitable replacement for Tanev in the offseason in Hamonic. Hamonic did struggle with injury at first, but eventually seemed to find his rhythm with Hughes in the latter half of the season. Unfortunately, that rhythm didn’t appear to have the same effect as the Hughes-Tanev duo. Maybe it was just due to a small sample size in a shortened season, but it still left even more questions about what to do on the right-side for the defence moving forward.

Because of these factors, Green was often forced to roll out different defensive pairings each game. He juggled Hughes, Edler, Myers and Schmidt in the top-four while Hamonic was injured, and had to balance all five when Hamonic was healthy. Green also had to go back and forth between Juolevi and fellow-rookie Jalen Chatfield to fill in the bottom pairing.

All of this really caused a problem for the Canucks.

As a result, their defencemen struggled with positioning and communication, and often had trouble completing outlet passes, carrying the puck out of their own end and gaining momentum in the neutral zone. They were also unable to send out a strong, reliable shutdown pairing when needed, something the team has struggled with since the combination of Dan Hamhuis and Kevin Bieksa back in 2011.

This didn’t effect Montreal nearly as much, as both Claude Julien and Dominique Ducharme were always confident in sending out their three pairings. Both coaches were also able to use either Weber or Petry on the right side, as well as Chiarot or Edmundson on the left, for their shutdown combinations.

And, as expected, when you experiment with different defensive pairings at even strength, it’ll also happen on the penalty kill, too.

This leads us to the second factor – special teams.

For the most part, the Canucks were consistent with their penalty-killing defencemen, opting for Hamonic, Edler, Myers and Schmidt, but not by choice.

The team couldn’t rely defensively on Juolevi and/or Chatfield at this point in their development, and they weren’t going to add even more minutes to Hughes’ plate, especially since he had some of his own defensive fundamentals to improve upon. That only left the four aforementioned players who, when actually put into the penalty kill situations, ended up dropping the ball most of the time, particularly Edler and Myers, who always appeared one step behind the play.

Believe it or not, the Canucks actually finished the regular season with a higher penalty kill percentage than the Canadiens, sitting at 79.8% versus 78.5%, but it’s important to go beyond the numbers.

The Canadiens had a much better net penalty kill percentage which, according to the league’s revamped statistics section, accounts for how many shorthanded goals a team scores while down a man. As a result, the Canadiens finished 10th in the league at 83.7%, whereas the Canucks finished 14th at 83.1%. Not a huge difference, but Montreal was able to register nine short-handed goals this past season, compared to Vancouver’s six.

Yes, all of their short-handed goals were scored by forwards, but the build-up to the penalty kill production, in large part, was due to Montreal’s defencemen. They were able to effectively control the puck in their own end without panicking, either by blocking incoming shots or by pressuring their opponents enough so that they would cough up the puck. Once that was accomplished, the Montreal defencemen were able to spring the puck forward to one of their teammates for a possible scoring chance.

None of this was a common occurrence for the Canucks’ blueline during the penalty kill. They were often caught scrambling in front of the net, sprawling out much too early to intercept passes, or just making desperate, unsuccessful attempts to clear the puck. The Canucks also relied heavily on Thatcher Demko to limit powerplay scoring opportunities from their opponents, as indicated by his 54 high danger shots against (HDSA) on the penalty kill, according to Natural Stat Trick. This would be good for second-highest in the league, only behind Connor Hellebuyck. Price, on the other hand, only had 43 HDSA.

Again, the numbers aren’t a drastic difference between the two teams, but you can further emphasize the point by seeing which team can replicate their stats during the playoffs as well.

Currently, the Canadiens lead the league in both playoff penalty kill and net penalty kill, which sit at 91.4% and 102.9%. They’ve already scored four short-handed goals, and their defencemen were able to limit offensive juggernauts like Mitch Marner and Auston Matthews to only three combined powerplay points over seven games in the first round. They also kept Vegas’s powerplay at bay in game one, successfully killing off all four of their attempts, but will still definitely need to make more of a disciplined  effort to stay out of the box more in game two.

Obviously, we can’t perfectly compare these playoff stats to the Canucks this year, but the next best thing would be to look back on how they performed in the bubble. Over three series, the Canucks posted a penalty kill percentage of 80%, while tallying two shorthanded goals. Not too shabby, but it’s also important to remember that this happened with the services of Tanev and Troy Stecher instead of Hamonic and Schmidt, so it’s not exactly a true comparison. But again, the next best thing.

The bottom line? The Canucks, despite how cohesive and reliable they appeared on paper, will need to work on the overall chemistry and communication of their defencemen. Could they figure it all out as soon as next year? They have the young talent to at least try, but only time will tell. This writer isn’t too optimistic, but he also loves to be proved wrong.

What are your thoughts on how Vancouver’s defence stacks up against Montreal’s? Let us know in the comments below!